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I. INTRODUCTION
The temple of the law has been built one stone upon the
other. Unfortunately, the edifice upon which the peace and
tranquility of humankind rests is far from complete. Every civi-
lized society is based on at least three pillars: 1) a code of laws
that define clearly what is permissible or prohibited; 2) courts
to resolve differences; and 3) a system of effective enforcement
to deter future transgressions. Code, courts and enforcement
form a synergistic tripod for an integrated and balanced regime
designed to curb international violence by the rule of law.
Unfortunately, our interdependent world still lacks many
of the vital components needed for stability. Consequently, in-
dividuals, groups and nations commit massive crimes against
humanity with impunity and resort to illegal military might to
settle differences that seem intractable. The world has not yet
grasped the reality that law is better than war.
II. VISIONS OF WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW
A. The United Nations
After some forty million people were killed during World
War II, world leaders led by the United States devised what it
hoped would be a more peaceful world order. Collective security
was to be safeguarded by a new United Nations Organization
governed by rules of international law that would "save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war." Social goals and
principles of humanitarian behavior were prescribed in the
United Nations Charter adopted in 1945. Member States were
expected to disarm, forego the use of force and rely on interna-
tional military contingents to carry out Security Council man-




In order to gain widespread acceptance, many Charter pro-
visions were couched in language that was amenable to differ-
ent interpretations. The United Nations Charter Preamble
spoke of "equal rights of nations large and small" but some were
more equal than others. The victorious allied powers, United
States, United Kingdom, Russia, France and China, retained
the exclusive right to veto any enforcement action by the Secur-
ity Council. Without that inequitable privilege it would have
been politically impossible to muster the needed consent of two-
thirds of the United States Senate that the United States Con-
stitution mandated before any treaty could be ratified. It
should have been obvious that without unanimity among the
five powers, the United Nations would be unable to achieve its
lofty humanitarian goals. When idealistic principles are sur-
rendered to realistic politics, humanity becomes the victim.
B. Nuremberg Trials and the Rule of Law
In addition to the frail United Nations Charter, the post-
war vision of world peace was buttressed by a reaffirmation of
the rule of law. Hitler and his henchmen had been warned in
1942 that they would be held accountable for the atrocities be-
ing committed by Nazi Germany. Under American leadership,
an International Military Tribunal (IMT), that included emi-
nent British, French and Soviet jurists, was convened in Nu-
remberg in 1945 to hold accountable those German leaders
responsible for planning or perpetrating the aggressions, crimes
against humanity and war crimes committed in flagrant viola-
tion of existing international laws. Twelve subsequent trials,
conducted in Nuremberg by the United States, laid bare the
criminality of the hierarchy that supported the Nazi terrors.
Aggressive war was held to be "the supreme international
crime." Crimes against humanity that shocked the conscience of
mankind, as well as massive violations of traditional rules of
war were also punishable regardless of the rank or station of
the perpetrator. Vengeance or retribution against the German
people was rejected as a policy. Those leaders found guilty, after
a fair trial, were sentenced to death or imprisonment. Justice
Robert Jackson, on leave from the United States Supreme
Court to serve as American Chief Prosecutor at the IMT trials,
proclaimed: "We must never forget that the record on which we
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judge these defendants today is the record on which history will
judge us tomorrow." His successor for the dozen subsequent
Nuremberg trials, General Telford Taylor (later a Professor at
Columbia University) reaffirmed the fundamental principle
that law must apply equally to everyone. At Nuremberg, the
rule of law took a step forward.
The Nuremberg Principles were unanimously affirmed by
the first General Assembly of the United Nations. Committees
were appointed to draft a Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind as a foundation for a permanent interna-
tional criminal court. A United Nations Convention was
adopted to punish the crime of genocide, but nations were not
yet ready to accept any international tribunal to punish even
that horrendous crime. Because of opposition of a small minor-
ity in the United States Senate, forty years would pass before
the President could ratify the Genocide Convention and then
only with crippling reservations. With no court to try the perpe-
trators, genocide continued to be committed with impunity in
various parts of the world.
III. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE DREAM?
A. Chilling Effects of the Cold War
The ideological war between the Soviet Union and the
United States influenced every decision. United Nations com-
mittees operated on the principle of consensus; that meant, in
effect, that every member could veto anything. The absence of
an agreed upon definition of aggression was the excuse given for
lack of progress toward an international criminal court. De-
bates were interminable and inconclusive. United States sup-
port for the court vacillated. By 1954, several drafts had been
considered, however the time for the law to take another step
forward was "not yet ripe." In 1974, after decades of futile
wrangling, by consensus the crime of aggression was defined.
The definition listed many examples of prohibited acts but the
ultimate decision whether aggression by a State had been com-
mitted required the concurrence of all five Permanent Council
Members. The agreed upon definition provided new impetus to
the United Nations, but it needed new acts of aggression, geno-





B. The Security Council Asserts Its Authority
In August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, a friendly and neigh-
boring Arab state. It was a case of flagrant aggression accom-
panied by a host of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The United States, with major oil interests in the area, took the
lead in obtaining Security Council Resolution 678 authorizing
States to use "all necessary means to repel the aggression and
restore peace in the area." The assertion of Council authority
was the type of response the United Nations Charter had envi-
sioned, but for which political will was usually lacking. In a
stunning military victory, led by United States forces, Iraq was
driven out of Kuwait in a hundred hours. It was sadly ironic
that the victors could not muster the will to bring the perpetra-
tors of the international crimes committed by Iraq before a
court of justice as they had promised. Unfortunately, there was
still no competent international court in existence.
Nuremberg had taught that only those leaders responsible
for international crimes should be tried and punished. Instead,
the people of Iraq, many of whom may have opposed the brutal
policies of their dictator Saddam Hussein, were subjected to
United States-led bombardment and international economic
sanctions. The individual generally regarded as primarily re-
sponsible for the harm was allowed to remain free. Political
realists expected Hussein to be toppled and they feared that the
next tyrant, possibly from Iran, might be worse for the United
States. Politics prevailed over principle. It was a political blun-
der that would cost the world dearly.
Beginning around 1991, rival ethnic groups in Yugoslavia
declared their independence as sovereign States. War erupted,
accompanied by campaigns of mass rapes and "ethnic cleans-
ing" bordering on genocide. Having suffered a humiliating de-
feat in Somalia a few years earlier, when United States Rangers
were ambushed while on a humanitarian mission, the United
States was unwilling to risk its troops to stop the killings. In-
stead, the Security Council, encouraged by the US, turned to
the rule of law. In Resolution 808, which was passed in 1993,
the Council decided to establish a tribunal "for the prosecution
of persons responsible for serious violations of international hu-
manitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia since 1991." Within a matter of weeks, an ad hoc
2003]
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International Criminal Tribunal was created. It was a long-
overdue building block on the edifice started at Nuremberg.
In 1994, over half a million people were brutally butchered
during ethnic conflicts and genocidal slaughter in Rwanda. The
massacres could have been prevented but those with the power
to halt the killings lacked the will, wisdom or political courage
to take the military risks. Instead, in response to justified cries
of universal indignation, the Security Council promptly created
another ad hoc tribunal for crimes committed in Rwanda. Both
of these new criminal tribunals received significant support
from the United States. Despite initial start-up problems, the
ad hoc tribunals have been functioning reasonably well and
have been creating important precedents to uphold and expand
international humanitarian law. With unrestrained violence
continuing in other parts of Africa and the world, it became in-
creasingly apparent that a proliferation of special ad hoc tribu-
nals created by the Security Council after the harm had been
done, and covering only crimes committed in a limited area dur-
ing a specific time, was hardly a fair or efficient way to deter
international criminality. The improvised ad hoc courts of the
Security Council were important new stones added to the inter-
national legal edifice but much more was needed to establish
universal justice. As the Nuremberg trials had made abun-
dantly clear: to be worthy of its name, law must apply equally to
everyone, everywhere.
IV. A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (ICC)
A. The Challenge
In 1995, President Clinton, addressing a large audience
honoring the memory of Tom Dodd, one of the leading United
States Prosecutors at Nuremberg, reaffirmed America's com-
mitment to uphold the Nuremberg principles. By the end of
that year, the General Assembly decided to establish a special
Preparatory Committee to consider drafts prepared after de-
cades of deliberation by experts on the International Law Com-
mission. None of the states opposed the drafts. In 1997,
President Clinton addressed the United Nations and called for
the early establishment of a permanent International Criminal
Court. United Nations committees, representing 185 nations




ating a fair, efficient and effective new judicial regime to try
leading perpetrators of massive international crimes. It was a
daunting challenge.
B. The Rome Statute
Following several years of intense deliberations in count-
less meetings, the competent and determined United Nations
jurists and diplomats were approaching possible compromises
on differences of substance, procedure and wording. After five
weeks of hectic negotiations that took place in Rome, a final
agreement was reached on July 21, 1998. According to the
terms of the court statute, the ICC would be incorporated into a
treaty that nations could sign and ratify as provided in their
own constitutions. One hundred twenty nations voted for the
Court. Seven voted against it and twenty-one abstained. The
hall burst into wild and sustained applause. Young people from
all over the world led the cheers as part of a coalition of almost
1000 civic groups.
Committee Chairman Philippe Kirsch of Canada spoke of
"humanity's finest hour." United States Ambassador, David
Scheffer, surrounded by representatives from the Senate and
Pentagon, sat glumly silent. The United States vote against the
treaty was joined by such strange bedfellows as Libya, Yemen,
Qatar and Algeria, that many considered "Rogue States." Israel
reluctantly followed in the footsteps of the United States. Since
many concessions had been made to satisfy America's concerns,
the failure of the United States to vote for the Court was a big
disappointment to the overwhelming majority.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who flew to
Rome for the ceremony, hailed the International Criminal
Court as "The hope of future generations." The Rome Statute
was a prototype for a new institution that many considered the
missing link in the world's legal order. It was obvious to all that
the newborn babe would have to be nurtured and helped to real-
ize its full potential. According to its terms, at least 60 nations
would have to ratify the treaty before it would become binding
on all. However, no one anticipated the vehemence of US ef-
forts to abort the court or cripple it in its cradle.
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V. UNITED STATES OBJECTIONS TO THE COURT
It is inevitable in every great democracy that there are dif-
ferences of opinion on most important subjects. The establish-
ment of new international courts with binding authority has
always been contentious. Therefore, it is perfectly understand-
able that some voices in the United States should oppose the
idea of a new international criminal court with compulsory ju-
risdiction over United States nationals. The most determined
and outspoken opponent of any such tribunal has been Senator
Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Similar views are held by other
conservatives in the Congress, the administration and the coun-
try. Those who, in good faith, oppose the ICC for valid reasons
are entitled to have their opinions considered and respected.
Their arguments should be evaluated to determine whether
they are well founded and whether or not they serve the best
interests of the nation and the world.
Those who favor the ICC are entitled to the same consider-
ation. They see an international criminal court as an essential
link in a more humane and peaceful world order that will bene-
fit everyone. Since genocide, crimes against humanity and ma-
jor war crimes are almost invariably committed with the
connivance and support of a government, the absence of any in-
ternational tribunal will almost surely mean that, unless the
guilty regime is overthrown, the perpetrators will never be
tried. Supporters of the court feel strongly that the time has
come for such impunity to end. They argue that a country torn
by civil strife will lack the political will or legal institutions
needed to try wrongdoers. If tyrants are able to evade justice,
their victims will seek vengeance and take the law into their
own hands. Thus, there can be no justice without peace and no
peace without justice.
Supporters of the Court admit that the Rome Statute is far
from perfect. It is a product of negotiated compromise by very
many nations with different views and legal systems. To wait
for perfection may mean to wait forever. Shabtai Rosenne, re-
tired Ambassador of Israel and a renowned legal scholar, con-
cluded that the ICC, despite current defects that could be
repaired, was a major legal creation that "will shine on the re-




Those who oppose the ICC insist upon absolute guarantees
in advance that no United States nationals will ever come
under its jurisdiction. Let us consider the three main objections
voiced by opponents of the Court:
A. Fear of an Unrestrained Prosecutor
It has been argued that the Statute does not contain ade-
quate restraints on the Prosecutor, thereby risking the danger
that Americans may be subjected to political prosecutions that
would inhibit United States military interventions for humani-
tarian or national security reasons. No other country has raised
this objection. The truth is that no other Prosecutor in human
history has been subjected to as many controls as exist in the
ICC Statute:
*The national State has priority over the International Court.
Only leaders responsible for planning and perpetrating the
crimes are the intended targets, and only if their own State is
unable or unwilling to give them a fair trial that is not a sham.
The US will always be given priority to try its own nationals.
*Only crimes committed after July 1, 2002, can be considered.
There is no retroactivity.
*The Prosecutor cannot start an investigation without prior au-
thorization from a three-judge panel, subject to appeals to five
other judges.
*Eighteen highly qualified international judges, male and fe-
male, sworn to uphold the law and justice, will decide by major-
ity vote whether the accused is guilty. There is no death
penalty.
*The Prosecutor can only investigate crimes that meet strictly
defined definitions as crimes against humanity, genocide or ma-
jor war crimes "of concern to the international community as a
whole." United States negotiators agreed to the definitions that
bind the Prosecutor.
*The Prosecutor must prove that the defendant knew that the
act was criminal and intended the unlawful consequences.
Proof of guilty knowledge and intent must be established be-
yond reasonable doubt.
*The Security Council can direct the ICC to cease any prosecu-
tions that might interfere with peace negotiations. Suspensions
can be renewed indefinitely.
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*The ICC is under the complete control of the very many coun-
tries that form the Assembly of State Parties - including the
entire European Community, England, France, Germany, Ca-
nada, Australia and many other faithful friends of the United
States. They control the budget and can fire anyone who might
be tempted to politicize the office.
*Proceedings must be open to public view. Unjustified prosecu-
tions for political reasons would soon be blocked by public
outrage.
*The ICC has no police force or other effective enforcement
mechanism. The acceptance of its judgments depends upon the
Court's reputation for integrity and competence. A frivolous
Prosecutor could not remain in office. Politization of the Court
would amount to its suicide.
*It should be noted that early United States demands that only
the Security Council could authorize prosecutions, were turned
down by the others because they insisted upon an independent
Prosecutor free of political influence.
B. Protecting United States Constitutional Rights
It has been argued that the ICC Statute would deprive
United States nationals of the right to fair trial as guaranteed
by the United States Constitution. The truth is that trials by
the ICC offer far more protection to US nationals than they
would receive if the ICC did not exist. The Statute guarantees
"due process" as provided in the United States Bill of Rights as
follows:
*Presumption of innocence.
*Speedy and public trial.
*Assistance of counsel.
*Right to remain silent.
*Privilege against self-incrimination.
*Right to written statement of charges.
*Right to examine witnesses.
*No ex post facto prosecutions.
*Protection against double jeopardy.
*No arrest warrants without probable cause.
*Right to be present at trial.
*Exclusion of illegally obtained evidence.




It is true that the ICC Statute does not provide for trial by
jury, a right originally intended to protect against secret star-
chamber proceedings by the English King. Those who make this
argument seem to forget that the Sixth Amendment to the Bill
of Rights calls for "an impartial jury of the State or District
wherein the crime was committed." A foreign venue is not likely
to be more protective than the international court. No crimes
committed abroad are covered by the United States Constitu-
tion. Members of the military have never been entitled to a
trial by jury but are subject to Courts Martial in a military trial.
Juries are often unreliable and not used in most countries. It is
not unreasonable, unfair or a violation of "due process" for the
ICC to accept a compromise that includes such an impressive
list of human rights protections for the accused.
Professor Robinson 0. Everett, Chief Judge of the Court of
Military Appeals, has suggested that Federal Statutes could be
amended to completely cover all the crimes under ICC jurisdic-
tion. The ICC, being required by its Statute to yield primary
jurisdiction to the United States for the fair trial of its nation-
als, would thereby divest the ICC of any authority over Ameri-
can citizens. The risk that United States proceedings would be
held to be a sham that would be ignored by the ICC is conceiva-
ble but, in fact, is so far-fetched as not to constitute a plausible
objection.
The rights contained in the ICC Statute reinforced the con-
clusion of the American Bar Association in February 2001 that:
"The security interests of the United States and of its service
members and officials are as fully protected as reasonably could
be provided for by an international treaty. Indeed, these na-
tional and individual interests are better protected if the United
States joins the ICC than if we reject it." It is sadly ironic that
those who oppose the ICC as a "kangaroo court," raise no objec-
tion to United States detaining suspected terrorists under con-
ditions that deny them rights that would exist for any American
tried by the ICC.
C. United States Sovereignty is Impaired
Critics of the ICC argue that the Court infringes on United
States sovereignty. The truth is that medieval notions of abso-
lute state sovereignty, where by Divine right the monarch and
20031
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his male heirs were above the law, went out with Magna Carta
in 1215 and were repudiated by the United States Declaration
of Independence. In democratic States, sovereignty resides not
in the reigning Monarch, or President, but in the people. The
world could not function for one day without the thousands of
laws, rules, regulations and agreements that bind all nations to
certain commonly accepted standards of behavior. Every
treaty, by creating mutually accepted obligations, infringes on
the national "sovereignty" of the signatories. But even if there
is no treaty, or it is not signed, certain universal prohibitions
must be respected to protect the interests of people everywhere.
Rules, written and unwritten, governing permissible war-
fare have been in existence since man first went into battle. In-
ternational law, like domestic law, does not advance solely by
statute; it grows by practice, custom and binding legal decisions
to meet the needs of a constantly changing society. Interna-
tional "rules of the road," enable this interconnected global soci-
ety to function more efficiently. Piracy has always been treated
as punishable wherever the pirates are captured. The widely ac-
cepted codifications by the International Committee of the Red
Cross are now binding on everyone - whether or not they are
ratified. Genocide, grave breaches of the rules of war and other
crimes against humanity are now in the same category. The
Rome Statute does not impose any novel obligations since all
nations are already bound to respect its restraints. The duty not
to commit the crimes is not new; only the mechanism for en-
forcement is being added via the ICC. Brandishing a tattered
banner of absolute State sovereignty is hardly a persuasive ar-
gument against the need to bring perpetrators of massive crimi-
nality before the bar of justice.
It was the United States that led the world at Nuremberg
in establishing the universally binding prohibitions that no per-
son and no nation had a sovereign right to commit genocide and
crimes against humanity with impunity. The implied promise
was that "never again" would the perpetrators escape judg-
ment. It is to uphold those legal principles and to curb the worst
abuses of State power that the ICC was created. Human rights
are not diminished but enhanced by the ICC. Jingoistic slo-
gans may be politically appealing but are never an acceptable





Undersecretary of State John Bolton, a leading spokesman
for Senator Helms, argued that international law is not really
law since it is not binding or enforceable. He considered the
Rome Statute too vague - despite its detailed definitions
worked out with consent of United States negotiators. He did
not believe that the ICC could deter the crimes under its juris-
diction and denounced human rights advocates like Aryeh
Neier of The Open Society Institute for their "utopian zeal." He
also expressed grave concern that the US might be accused of
aggression - despite the fact that the ICC has no authority to
consider such a charge until some time after 2009 and only if
there is complete agreement on a new definition that recognizes
the role of the Security Council. The innocent need never fear
the rule of law. Those who seek to exclude aggression from scru-
tiny are bound to make their weaker and law-abiding neighbors
rather nervous.
A more moderate position is taken by Professor Ruth Wedg-
wood of Yale, an Advisor to the Pentagon who has written ex-
tensively and skeptically about the new Court. She notes that
the law of armed conflict is indeterminate and new technologies
may require actions against unconventional adversaries that
some might interpret as legal violations. Giving the United
States priority to try United States nationals for war crimes
won't guarantee justice since the United States is not likely to
try its own soldiers who are carrying out official instructions
and the ICC might then seek to intervene. She argues that
United States humanitarian intervention or preemptive strikes
against weapons of mass destruction may be necessary and
should not give rise to criminal indictments -"despite the disap-
proval of academics." She refers to "the moral responsibility of
sovereign States." Little thought seems to have been given to
the possibility that other nations would assert the same rights
to ignore existing law and what the consequences might be for
world order. She concludes that it would be wise for the Admin-
istration to see how the ICC progresses before deciding whether
it is in the United States interest to support the Court.
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VI. COERCION AS PERSUASION
When it began to appear that the arguments advanced by
opponents of the ICC would not be persuasive to most nations, a
more belligerent tactic was adopted by Senator Helms and his
Conservative friends. If persuasion wouldn't work, they rea-
soned, try coercion. With Pentagon support, the assault against
the Court advanced on several fronts: a) Legislation was intro-
duced to prohibit and penalize any cooperation with the ICC; b)
The Court would be further undermined by repudiating the
United States government's signature on the Rome Treaty; c)
All United States funds that might aid the Court would be cut
off; d) The United States threatened to withdraw its forces from
United Nations peacekeeping missions unless they were given
absolute legal immunity from foreign prosecution; and e) A
worldwide campaign was launched to obtain bilateral agree-
ments to block all assistance to the ICC and guarantee that no
Americans would ever be handed over to the international
court.
A. United States Legislation to Thwart the ICC
Jesse Helms, throughout his long career in the Senate, had
always opposed foreign intervention in America's affairs. In
2000, he introduced legislation intended to scuttle the ICC. It
threatened economic and military sanctions against States that
cooperated with the Court. It also authorized the President to
"use all means necessary and appropriate" to free any United
States personnel arrested on behalf of the Court. Critics
mocked it as "The Hague Invasion Act." The Dutch were not
amused. Despite its appealing but misleading title, the Ameri-
can Service members' Protection Act (ASPA) endangered the
military more than it protected them. Without an international
court to protect their rights, captured United States soldiers
would be completely at the mercy of their captors.
In support of the ASPA, Helms succeeded in procuring the
signatures of a dozen former Republicans, including ex-Secre-
tary of State Henry Kissinger, Defense Secretary Donald Rum-
sfeld and other distinguished public servants, who supported
his initiative that contained the same canards about an unre-
strained prosecutor, infringement on United States sovereignty,




rorists and protect its interests. A very distinguished legal ex-
pert, Monroe Leigh, who had been Advisor to both the State and
Defense Departments and President of the American Society of
International Law, assembled ten former Presidents of the Soci-
ety to support his conclusion that arguments against the Court
were unfounded and unjustified.
A few courageous voices were raised in Congress to support
the Court. Senator Patrick Lehigh, Democrat of Vermont, re-
butted the false arguments and hailed the Court as an institu-
tion that would uphold America's national interests. He
characterized the Pentagon's demands for a guarantee that no
United States soldiers would ever come before the ICC as "a to-
tally untenable position." (Dec. 15, 2000). Senator Christopher
Dodd of Connecticut, whose father had been a leading prosecu-
tor at the Nuremberg trials, expressed the same sentiments. In
the House of Representatives Congressmen Tom Lantos and
Patrick Kennedy pleaded for the Court and against going down
the road to isolationism and injustice. On May 9, 2001, Nobel
Laureate Elie Wiesel warned the House Committee against "US
acceptance of impunity for the world's worst atrocities."
After persistent maneuvering, the Helm's proposal was at-
tached to a supplementary appropriations bill and was pushed
through Congress. Relatively minor amendments gave the Pres-
ident discretion in enforcing the legislation. It was signed into
law by President Bush on August 2, 2002 as Public Law 107-
206. The right-wing argument, that the ICC was a threat to
America's military personnel and security interests at a time
when America was at war against terrorists, had great public
and political appeal. Once again, politics prevailed over reason.
B. Revoking a Prior President's Signature
After careful consideration in the White House, President
Clinton instructed United States Ambassador David Scheffer to
sign the Rome Statute just as the deadline was about to expire
on December 31, 2000. Israel promptly followed suit. Signing
was a reaffirmation of America's historical commitment to in-
ternational accountability ever since Nuremberg. Knowing that
there was no prospect of getting two-thirds of the Senators to
consent, Clinton, seeking to mollify both right-wingers and
human rights activists, said he would not recommend that it be
20031
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submitted for ratification. He wanted the United States to stay
engaged in order to help shape the Court and remain a key
player. As might have been expected, Senator Helms was livid.
The next day, the Chicago Tribune quoted Helms saying: "I will
make reversing this decision... one of my highest priorities in
the new Congress, this decision will not stand." It was as if the
Senator, backed by the Pentagon, was declaring war on the
ICC.
Under the terms of the Rome Statute, the Treaty would not
go into effect until it was ratified by at least sixty nations. De-
spite the fact that some countries would have to amend their
national Constitutions in order to be able to accept the jurisdic-
tion of an international court, ratifications came in much faster
than expected. On April 11, 2002, the minimum number
needed to put the treaty into effect was exceeded. Now retired,
ex-United States Ambassador Scheffer hailed it as "an ex-
tremely significant moment in world history." There was a joy-
ous celebration at the United Nations but the United Nations
seat reserved for the United States was empty. Scheffer's suc-
cessor, Ambassador Pierre Prosper, said: "There was no need to
attend." On April 17, the Atlanta Constitution commented on
United States intransigence and petulance saying: "The Bush
Administration wants to abandon our historic commitment to
the international rule of law." The Rome Treaty came into force
on July 1, 2002 - without the United States.
Senator Helms had warned that if the Treaty were sent to
the Senate for confirmation it would be "dead on arrival." The
Conservatives were now in control. On May 6, 2002, Helms' pro-
tg6, John Bolton, now Assistant Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security, sent a one-paragraph letter to the
United Nations: ". . . the United States does not intend to be-
come a party to the treaty. Accordingly, the United States has
no legal obligations arising from its signature of December 31,
2000." This unprecedented and unlimited repudiation of a sol-
emn Presidential commitment gave rise to an enormous outcry
from all over the world. The European Community was
stunned. Former United States Ambassador William Luers,
President of UNA-USA, said the world's first nation to disavow
its own signature served no worthy purpose, undermined




Amnesty International called it "a new nadir of isolationism
and exceptionalism."
C. Prohibiting US Funds for the ICC
An Appropriations Act providing funding for the Com-
merce, Justice and State Departments was amended on June
18, 2001, to prohibit any United States funds being expended to
assist the ICC in any way.(H.R.2500, Title VI, Sec. 623). The
reasons given for such drastic action were the usual ones voiced
in opposition to the Court. There was practically no debate. The
party in power controlled the purse and he who controlled the
purse called the tune.
D. No US Peacekeepers Without Immunity
As more nations ratified the ICC Treaty, and agreements
were reached on the rules to govern the Court, the fury of right-
wing United States opposition seemed to increase. On June 30,
one day before the Treaty was to go into effect, the United
States bellowed its defiance in a way that shocked everyone.
Standing alone against all fourteen other Security Council
members, the United States, as it had warned, cast a veto scut-
tling a resolution extending the mandate of United Nations
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. It indicated that unless all
of its troops were guaranteed complete immunity by Security
Council resolution it would withdraw from all United Nations
peacekeeping. It was a frontal assault on the existing interna-
tional order. All the nations that had accepted the ICC joined
in strong protest against the United States action. Richard
Dicker of Human Rights Watch had called the United States
threat "an ideological jihad against international justice." Wil-
liam Pace, coordinator of a vast coalition of non-governmental
organizations, said: "The message that they're delivering is that
it's more important to them to torpedo the ICC than to preserve
peacekeeping at the United Nations and around he world." Af-
ter much diplomatic skirmishing, a last-minute compromise
was reached that enabled the Bosnia mission to continue. But
the United States insisted that it would continue to raise the
issue with all other peacekeeping missions.
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E. Bilateral agreements to Block Extradition
The Pentagon instructed its attaches in foreign ministries
to seek special agreements that would defeat any ICC attempt
to bring Americans to trial. Bolton, described as "Bush's
hatchet-man in the State Department," while denying any in-
tention to oust the ICC, embarked on a worldwide tour to do
just that. The United States frequently entered into Status of
Forces Agreements (SOFA) that required American soldiers ar-
rested for crimes committed on foreign soil to be surrendered to
the United States for trial rather than being tried under the
local national laws. On United States initiative, a rather cum-
bersome provision was written into the Rome Statute, Article
98, to respect such pre-existing treaty obligations. Someone fig-
ured out that if new surrender of forces agreements could be
concluded along the same lines it might be possible to com-
pletely divest the ICC of jurisdiction. The fact that such an in-
terpretation would clearly distort the intended meaning of
Article 98, and would violate the Rome Treaty obligation of all
parties to assist the court, did not disturb Mr. Bolton.
Ambassador Scheffer, who negotiated the Article 98 text on
behalf of the United States, wrote in The Wall Street Journal on
September 20, 2002 that the Bush administration overreached
by trying to use that article to immunize all United States na-
tionals. That did not stop Bolton's campaign of misinterpreta-
tion backed up by threats of United States sanctions. The
European Community was incensed at the brazenness of the
United States assault and insulted by the notion that they
would have accepted a clause that would allow all signatories to
undermine the essential purpose of the Treaty. Several States,
believing that a situation where they would want to send an
American to the ICC would probably never arise, reluctantly
concluded that it would be in their political and economic inter-
est to sign on temporarily to the unreasonable American de-
mand. The image of the United States as a bully could not be
avoided. America's reputation for integrity and respect for law
was surely not enhanced.
VII. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
The most predictable thing about the future is that it is




movements that are detectable and, once perceived, can be in-
fluenced by human effort. So it is with the development of the
rule of law. There can be no doubt that there has been an evolu-
tionary movement toward the legal control of human behavior
in many fields. Pollution of the environment, regulations gov-
erning seas, space and the protection of fundamental human
rights are among the many areas brought under international
controls during recent years. It seems inevitable that the prohi-
bition of massive violence against innocent people should also
be prohibited and deterred by law.
A. Historical Indicators
The problem of creating international courts with binding
authority has engaged the government of the United States for
over a century. At the "First Peace Conference" in the Hague in
1899, Elihu Root, founder and President of the American Soci-
ety of International Law and a former Senator and Secretary of
State, was a strong advocate for international tribunals. When
Great Britain was on the brink of conflict over seizures of neu-
tral vessels as a prize of war, she welcomed the idea of creating
a new international court. Proposals for the International Prize
Court were on the verge of general acceptance in 1907. Presi-
dent Theodore Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, hailed
"the great advance which the world is making toward the sub-
stitution of the rule of reason and justice for simple force."
Before all necessary ratifications could be completed, disagree-
ments arose regarding some of the rules that would govern the
tribunal. Britannia ruled the waves and insisted on waiving
the rules. When no agreement on details could be reached, the
widely acclaimed court was torpedoed. The world just missed
the boat.
In a speech on December 17, 1910, President Howard Taft
called for an international court as "a better method of settling
controversies than war." The need for a criminal court should
have become obvious in 1914 when Archduke Ferdinand of Aus-
tria was assassinated by Serbian nationalists. Instead of legal
trial, nations turned to trial by battle. Amidst the bloodshed of
World War One, France, Great Britain and Russia denounced
Turkey's 1915 massacre of its Armenian minority as "crimes
against humanity." Diplomatic protests were ignored. There
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was no international court to try or deter the criminals. After
countless millions perished, United States President Woodrow
Wilson proposed a treaty to maintain peace via a League of Na-
tions. A conservative minority in the United States Senate
foiled his attempt to get two-thirds of the Senators to consent to
ratification of the Treaty. Legal experts appointed by the
League concluded that an international criminal court should
be created to hold accountable those responsible for Germany's
aggressions and atrocities. Their recommendations were quietly
pushed aside by the diplomats in charge.
In 1934, King Alexander of Yugoslavia was assassinated by
a Croatian nationalist. It was reminiscent of the murder of
Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 that had ignited the First World
War. To calm the international hubbub, France proposed that
an international penal code be drafted to condemn assassina-
tions and that an international court be created to punish ter-
rorists. Two Conventions were drafted by 1935 and revised by
1937, after passions had cooled. Only India ratified the Terror-
ism Convention and not a single State ratified the one calling
for an International Criminal Court. Neither Convention ever
went into force. The United States, catering to strong isolation-
ist sentiments, remained aloof. Diplomats trained to think first
and foremost of the interests of their own country were unwill-
ing or unable to change their way of thinking. They would soon
pay dearly for their indecision.
The failure to hold high-ranking criminals accountable was
recalled years later by Adolf Hitler, who commented contemptu-
ously when launching the Holocaust: "Who remembers the
Armenians?" The horrors of World War II need not be described
here. We will never know how many wars could have been
avoided or how many deaths could have been prevented if inter-
national courts had been created when proposed. The Perma-
nent Court of International Justice set up in The Hague by the
League of Nations could only deal with civil disputes submitted
by consenting States. It had no criminal jurisdiction whatso-
ever. The unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany in 1945
paved the way for the assumption of governmental powers by
the victors and the legal creation of the International Military





Our scan of history reveals that fortuitous events and
changes in political climate can have a decisive influence on the
speed and direction of change. World War I inspired efforts to
put the Kaiser on trial for aggression and to hold German of-
ficers accountable for their atrocities. The efforts failed. World
War II produced the Nuremberg trials, followed by similar war
crimes trials in Tokyo and elsewhere. The mass rapes and geno-
cidal acts in Yugoslavia induced the Security Council to set up a
special tribunal in 1993 to punish those responsible. The
shameful genocide in Rwanda gave rise to another ad hoc crimi-
nal tribunal.
Continuing atrocities elsewhere generated talk of more in-
ternational trials and the beginning of movements in that direc-
tion. For almost a century, the United States government was
in the forefront of those advocating an international criminal
jurisdiction. In upholding principles of justice and law, it earned
the appreciation and respect of embattled people everywhere.
Just as a permanent International Criminal Court was about to
come into existence, the Bush Administration became the
leader in trying to destroy it.
B. Philosophical Differences
The reasons stated to justify opposition to the ICC are not
persuasive. Basic philosophical differences may help explain
the dissent. "Realists" note that the United Nations Charter has
not saved succeeding generations from war; nor has it pre-
vented massive atrocities. Its terms are too vague and its con-
trols too political to be effective in a world divided by enormous
political, religious and social differences. As a result, powerful
States may deem it necessary to intervene militarily for human-
itarian or national reasons that other States might regard as
aggression.
To avoid the risk of being accused of illegal conduct, "Real-
ists" in the Defense Department, and Conservatives in the gov-
ernment, prefer a free hand without judicial interference. It has
been argued that United States interventions without prior Se-
curity Council approval is lawful, as shown by the absence of
Council resolutions condemning what has become a fairly com-
mon practice There is some merit in those arguments, but not
much. The fact that a law cannot be enforced because the police
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are impotent does not render the violation lawful. Opposition to
the ICC is a negation of the rule of law.
C. Political Realities
New legal institutions cannot be created in a vacuum.
George W. Bush of Texas was chosen as President of the United
States in November 2000 by the narrowest of margins. He
could hardly afford to antagonize Conservatives whose support
had won him the election. His cabinet appointments signaled a
new wind blowing in Washington. Before a year had passed,
the occurrence of unforeseeable events would have a profound
influence on how the Administration would view the rule of law
and the ICC.
On September 11, 2001, hijacked American passenger
planes were used as bombs to crash into the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center in New York, 19 Arab "suicide bombers"
perished along with some 3000 innocent people. Americans
were horrified, outraged and traumatized. The President de-
clared "war" on Al-Qaeda, a militant Muslim organization be-
lieved to be behind the attacks. The country was mobilized and
reorganized to fight terrorism by every available means.
United States forces attacked Afghanistan in search for terror-
ist hiding places. Conservatives threatened to use military and
economic sanctions against any nation that failed to assist the
United States.
No one in the government suggested that an International
Criminal Court might be a correct forum for the trial of those
responsible for this outrageous crime against humanity. On the
contrary, the campaign against the ICC was intensified. Judge
Richard Goldstone, a prominent South African human rights
advocate who served with distinction as Chief Prosecutor for
the International Criminal Court for Yugoslavia, said United
States opposition to the ICC "borders nearly on the irrational."
The Bush Administration did little to conceal its scorn for
the United Nations and international law. Suspected terrorists
were seized in various parts of the world, transported to a
United States naval base in Cuba to be held incommunicado for
an indefinite period. The President announced that he would
get rid of the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, even if the




in the face of strong public protest and the United States turned
to the Council for a resolution requiring United Nations inspec-
tors to detect whether Iraq still possessed weapons of mass de-
struction. The American public, frightened by threats of
uncontrollable terrorism and the possibility of a new war, ral-
lied behind the flag and the Commander-in-Chief. Europeans
were getting even more concerned about what they perceived as
a new unilateralism and belligerence by the United States.
D. Long Range Prospects
The ICC Treaty has gone into effect and the Court will start
functioning soon - without the United States. A nation that sits
sulking on the sidelines cannot remain a leader for very long.
The majority of the American people do not agree with the posi-
tion on the ICC taken by the Bush Administration. The Finan-
cial Times of London reported on September 25, 2002 that a
survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations concluded
that 83% of United States nationals supported the use of the
ICC to try suspected terrorists and 65% favored the Court even
if it might bring a President to trial on trumped up charges.
There is no doubt that even some members of the cabinet and
other high-ranking officials do not share the negativism and ex-
ceptionalism of those in the Defense Department and Conserva-
tives in the Congress who have set their hand and mind against
the new Court. When the political climate changes, as hopefully
it will, a democratic society will reflect the will of the majority of
the people and the noble traditions of the nation.
No one should denigrate the courage or loyalty of patriotic
young people who serve in the military. There is no doubt that
the planners in the Pentagon make a serious effort to avoid vio-
lating the rules of war and the unintentional killing of civilians
that is euphemistically labeled "collateral damage." Despite
great admiration for America's past aspirations and accom-
plishments, no other nation in the world is prepared to accept
the proposition that international law to prevent massive
crimes applies to everyone else but not to the United States.
The trashcans of history are filled with the ashes of great
empires that once were the superpowers of their day. The tide of
history will not be turned back. In time, when the ICC has
proved itself as a fair and workable tribunal, the United States
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Government will recognize that insisting on blanket immunity
for United States nationals is not a tenable position. The best
way to assure that human rights will prevail over human
wrongs is to clarify and enforce international law for the protec-
tion of all. The best way to protect the United States military is
by preventing war-making itself. The best way to prevent war is
by learning why some young patriots are willing to kill or be
killed for their own particular cause. Teaching tolerance and
compassion and trying to ameliorate the ills or injustices that
give rise to the discontents that spawn recurrent bouts of de-
structive violence will do more to protect courageous people in
uniform than fighting against the ICC. The rule of law re-
mains the best hope for the protection of humankind.
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